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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TUITION
VOUCHERS: ADDRESS DELIVERED TO
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL, OCTOBER 7, 1992
ANTHONY CARDINAL BEVILACQUA, ARCHBISHOP OF PHILADELPHIA*
Coming, as I do, from Philadelphia-the City of Brotherly Love-I am
delighted to join this gathering in the beautiful land of Milwaukee, and I am
honored to have been asked to participate in the centennial celebration of
Marquette University Law School. I am reminded of a story about Dr.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. It is said that, while he was still practicing
medicine, Dr. Holmes was going to visit a patient just as a priest was leav-
ing the bedside.
"Good morning, doctor," said the priest, "your patient is very
ill-he is going to die."
"Yes," said Holmes, "and he's going to hell."
"No, I have just given extreme unction-and you must not say
such things!"
"Well," came the reply, "you expressed a medical opinion, and I
have just as much right to a theological opinion."1
I claim neither the wit of Dr. Holmes, the elder, nor the jurisprudential
acumen of his son, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. I do, however, have
an acute interest in the topic of this evening's conference: the constitution-
ality of educational choice legislation that would provide tuition vouchers
to parents for the school of their choice, whether public or private, sectarian
or nonsectarian.
Whether by coincidence or providence, I cannot say; however, it is in-
teresting that this host city has a parental choice program of public funding
to permit children from low-income families to attend private schools. Ear-
lier this year, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld this program.2 I
realize that the decision was based on the State Constitution of Wisconsin
and that the plan excludes private schools that have a religious affiliation.
The topic of my presentation this evening is the constitutionality-under
the United States Constitution--of a parental choice program that would
* J.C.D. 1956, Gregorian University (summa cum laude); M.A. 1962, Columbia University;
J.D. 1975, St. John's University; Honorary LL.D 1981, St. John's University.
1. M.A. DEWOLFE HowE, HOLMES OF THE BREAKFAST-TABLE 115 (1939).
2. Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992).
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provide tuition vouchers to parents regardless of the religious affiliation of
the school to which they wish to send their children.
In 1892, the year this law school was founded, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that "no purpose of action against religion can be
imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious peo-
ple."3 The Supreme Court long continued to give voice to this idea of toler-
ance of religion throughout the United States. Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court in 1952, stated this principle as follows:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an atti-
tude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one
group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adher-
ents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages reli-
gious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of
our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution
a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe.4
Yet, today, more than 200 years after the Bill of Rights was ratified, juris-
prudential precedent concerning the Religion Clause of the First Amend-
ment is quite muddled. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted this "doctrinal
confusion" with the following examples:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may
lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a
film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus ren-
dering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation to
religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different
building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State in-
3. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892).
4. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added).
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side the sectarian school are forbidden, but the State may conduct
speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it
must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer
parked down the street. A State may give cash to a parochial school
to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered
reporting services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared
tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in
public school, but the public school may release students during the
day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at
those classes with its truancy laws.'
Even worse than these seemingly inconsistent and irreconcilable distinc-
tions by the Court is the hint of hostility toward religious schools and their
teachers and administrators indicated in some Court opinions. This hostil-
ity exists despite the Court's repeated assertion that "[n]eutrality is what is
required. The State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither
advance nor impede religious activity."7
Currently, Establishment Clause challenges to programs involving pub-
lic assistance to religious-affiliated schools are considered under the three-
part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman :8 "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' "I
I believe that all three conditions of the Lemon test are met by a school
choice program that provides vouchers to parents in an effort to assist them
in the educational responsibilities of their children and, at the same time,
allows them to choose the school in which they wish to have their children
5. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (footnotes and
citations omitted); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that varied interpretations of the Establishment Clause have left even "the most conscien-
tious governmental officials" guessing what motives will be unconstitutional); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5 (1973) ("[l]t is evident from the
numerous opinions of the Court, and of Justices in concurrence and dissent in the leading cases
applying the Establishment Clause, that no 'bright line' guidance is afforded.").
6. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251-52 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); see
also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617-19 (1971).
7. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976); accord School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 382 (1985); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see also Arlin M. Adams
& Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1599 (1989)
("The separation concept, however, is really a servant of an even greater goal; it is a means, along
with concepts such as accommodation and neutrality, to achieve the ideal of religious liberty in a
free society.").
8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
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educated. Even Professor Laurence H. Tribe, not usually considered an
ally of religious school interests, said, "One would have to be awfully
clumsy to write voucher legislation that could not pass constitutional scru-
tiny.""0 Professor Tribe explained:
Although Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding a
book lending program violative of equal protection insofar as it
aided racially segregated schools) would seem to forbid using such
publicly subsidized vouchers at racially discriminatory private
schools, the cases from Everson through Wolman indicate that, so
long as the class of beneficiaries is sufficiently broad and so long as
aid is channeled only to parents and children, the establishment
clause should not pose an insuperable barrier to using such vouchers
at parochial schools. Indeed, to exclude only church-related schools
from such a voucher system might pose substantial free exercise
problems."1
As to the first part of the evaluation, there can be no doubt that a statute
granting vouchers to parents for their children's education has a "secular
legislative purpose." In Committee for Public Education & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist,12 the Court acknowledged the public purpose of educational
assistance legislation (although the statute was ultimately struck down as
unconstitutional), explaining:
We do not question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New
York's interest in preserving a healthy and safe educational environ-
ment for all of its school children. And we do not doubt-indeed,
we fully recognize-the validity of the State's interest in promoting
pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools.
Nor do we hesitate to acknowledge the reality of its concern for an
already overburdened public school system that might suffer in the
event that a significant percentage of children presently attending
nonpublic schools should abandon those schools in favor of the pub-
lic schools.13
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the principal or primary
effect must be one that "neither advances nor inhibits religion."14 Such
would be the case with a universally applied tuition voucher system. It
would permit parents of children to determine the schools of their choice
10. Can Vouchers Hurdle Church-State Wall?, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1991, at B5; see also
Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does
Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123.
11. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 846 n.33 (1978).
12. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
13. Id. at 773; accord Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Sloane v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825, 829-30 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
14. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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based upon nonmonetary matters (or at least with less of a concern about
cost than is currently the case). Any benefit to religion or religious institu-
tions would result indirectly from the free choice of individuals. This has
been specifically upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wit-
ters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind"5 and Mueller v.
Allen.' 6
In Witters, Justice Marshall wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court that
public funds, appropriated under a vocational rehabilitation assistance pro-
gram, could be used by a blind person to pay tuition at the Inland Empire
School of the Bible. 7 Central to Witters were the following factors: (1)
funding went to the recipient institution only through the free choice of the
individual student receiving the benefit from the state;18 (2) the program
made funds generally available to all students similarly situated without
regard to the public or nonpublic, sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the
institution;19 and (3) the program "creates no financial incentive for stu-
dents to undertake sectarian education."20
Justice Marshall succinctly set forth the issue in Witters: whether
the First Amendment precludes the State of Washington from ex-
tending assistance under a state vocational rehabilitation assistance
program to a blind person studying at a Christian College and seek-
ing to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Finding no
such federal constitutional barrier on the record presented to us, we
reverse and remand.2'
We would do well to be as succinct and direct: Does the First Amendment
preclude the national or state governments from extending assistance under
an educational choice program to financially overburdened taxpayers striv-
ing to fulfill their parental responsibilities (and state truancy laws) by assur-
ing their children's education? Paraphrased, that is the issue as framed in
Witters. The answer should be the same: No such federal constitutional
barrier exists.
Mueller upheld a Minnesota program allowing tax deductions for "ac-
tual expenses incurred for the 'tuition, textbooks and transportation' of de-
pendent children attending elementary or secondary schools."'2 2  In
15. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
16. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
17. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Id.
20. Id at 488.
21. Id. at 482.
22. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
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applying the three-part Lemon test, the Court agreed that the statute had a
secular legislative purpose:
A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses in-
curred by parents-regardless of the type of schools their children
attend-evidences a purpose that is both secular and understanda-
ble. An educated populace is essential to the political and economic
health of any community, and a State's efforts to assist parents in
meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this
secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry is well edu-
cated. Similarly, Minnesota, like other States, could conclude that
there is a strong public interest in assuring the continued financial
health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian. By edu-
cating a substantial number of students such schools relieve public
schools of a correspondingly great burden-to the benefit of all
taxpayers.23
The Court also held that the statute did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion. Among the considerations leading to this conclusion:
(1) the tax deduction for educational expenses was "only one among many
deductions.., under the Minnesota tax laws"; 24 (2) "the deduction is avail-
able for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose
children attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsec-
tarian private schools";25 and (3) under the Minnesota legislation, public
funds become available to religious institutions "only as a result of numer-
ous private choices of individual parents of school-age children."'26
The Mueller Court distinguished its earlier Nyquist decision, noting that
in Nyquist the public assistance was directed to parents of children in non-
public schools only. Moreover, and specifically relevant to our topic this
evening, the Court reiterated what had been intimated in Nyquist: "that
'public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without re-
gard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the insti-
tution benefitted' might not offend the Establishment Clause."' 27 Because
23. Id. at 395; cf Arlin M. Adams, Is the Supreme Court Making a Significant Shift in
Church-State Jurisprudence?, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, II, at 69,
78 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986) ("[T]he Founders had a deep faith in the Almighty and the bless-
ings of religion. When the schools can in some way teach young citizens tolerance and respect for
religious diversity, I believe that religion, the Constitution, and the nation will be better for it.").
24. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
25. Id, at 397 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 399.
27. Id. at 398 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 782-83 (1973)). Nyquist also had rejected the argument that its ruling on the First Amend-
ment in any way jeopardized the "educational assistance provisions of the 'G.I. Bill,' 38 U.S.C.
§ 1651." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 n.38.
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the Minnesota tax deduction entailed no new provisions for enforcement in,
or supervision of, religious schools, the Mueller Court dismissed any con-
cerns about "excessive entanglement" of the state and religion.2"
Two cases decided in 1992 are also of particular interest. In Luthens v.
Bair,29 U.S. District Chief Judge Harold D. Vietor upheld a statute permit-
ting tax credits or tax deductions for the payment of elementary or secon-
dary school tuition and the purchase of textbooks. The court found the tax
credit or deduction allowable under the Supreme Court's analysis in Muel-
ler and distinguishable from Nyquist.30 Among the findings of fact in his
opinion, Chief Judge Vietor noted that approximately ten percent of the
students in Iowa attended accredited nonpublic schools and that most of
those students attended Catholic schools, while others were enrolled in
schools affiliated with other religious denominations. 31 He noted that a
school must be accredited for the parents to receive the tax deduction or
credit, that some of the religious schools had a pervasive sectarianism, and
that the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance had issued a regulation
that would allow the deduction or credit only in proration of the costs in-
curred for their children's nonreligious tuition and textbook purchases.32
Chief Judge Vietor had no problem finding a secular legislative purpose.
Concerning the third part of the Lemon test, the court was just as confident
that there was no "excessive entanglement. ' 33 Noting that "the benefits of
the deduction/credit law go to the parents of schoolchildren rather than to
the schools,"' 34 the court found that "[t]heir 'character' is that of human
beings and their 'purpose' is to educate their children. '35 Answering the
plaintiffs' argument that the sectarian schools might need to be audited in
order to assure that an individual taxpayer's deduction or credit was appro-
priate, the court stated:
The danger of parochial school records being subpoenaed in connec-
tion with the audit of a tuition deduction appears to be minimal, if
not non-existent--certainly no greater than the danger of a sub-
poena to a church for records in connection with a claimed deduc-
tion of a charitable contribution to the church.36
28. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403.
29. 788 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
30. Id. at 1038.
31. IM at 1033.
32. Id. at 1033-35.
33. Id. at 1037-40.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id at 1041.
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In addressing whether the Iowa statute had a principal or primary effect
of advancing religion-the second part of the Lemon test-Chief Judge Vie-
tor engaged in a thorough analysis and distinguished Mueller from Nyquist.
In Nyquist, "[t]he New York statute provided for direct money grants to
nonpublic schools, a tuition grant program for tuition reimbursements to
qualifying parents of children attending nonpublic schools, and a form of
tax relief for those who failed to qualify for the tuition grant program."37
In Mueller, on the other hand, the aid was in the form of one of many
legislative tax deductions in Minnesota.
[T]he aid went to parents of schoolchildren rather than directly to
the schools; the financial benefit resulting to parochial schools was
attenuated; and the benefits of the law "can fairly be regarded as a
rough return for the benefits ... provided to the State and all tax-
payers by parents sending their children to parochial schools." The
same significant features characterize the Iowa law.38
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,39 a three-judge panel
held that the Establishment Clause prohibits government funds from being
used to employ a sign language interpreter for a deaf student in a Catholic
high school.' Although the issue seemed almost identical to that treated
by the Supreme Court in Witters, two of the three judges distinguished
Zobrest on the grounds that "the government would be required to place its
own employee in the sectarian school." '41 The majority in Zobrest found:
Here, denial of aid to the Zobrests does impose a burden on their
free exercise rights. They will have either to forgo a sectarian educa-
tion for James in order to receive the assistance of a sign language
interpreter for him at school, or they will have to pay the cost of the
interpreter's services themselves, while keeping him at Salpointe.
However, a compelling state interest justifies the imposition of
this burden. The government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that the Establishment Clause is not violated.42
Circuit Judge Thomas Tang filed a spirited dissenting opinion.43
37. Id. at 1038.
38. Id. (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 368, 402 (1983) (citation omitted)).
39. 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
40. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196-97.
41. Id. at 1195.
42. Id. at 1196-97.
43. Id. at 1197 (Tang, J., dissenting). This is worth reading for Judge Tang's analysis of the
relevant Supreme Court cases and his view of the relationship between the free exercise and estab-
lishment aspects of religious liberty.
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I agree with the majority's conclusion that denying the Zobrests
a sign language interpreter unconstitutionally burdens their free ex-
ercise of religion.
However, because I do not believe that the provision of a sign
language interpreter in this case violates the Establishment Clause of
the federal Constitution, I would hold that no compelling interest
justifies the state's withholding of benefits. To the extent the School
District has an interest in separating church and state further than
required by the First Amendment, that interest must yield to the
Zobrests' free exercise rights. "[T]he State interest asserted here-in
achieving greater separation of Church and State than is already en-
sured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution-
is limited by the Free Exercise Clause."'
As I have explained, I believe that a generally applied system of vouch-
ers to allow parents to enroll their children in the schools of their choice-
public, private, religious or nonsectarian-is within the bounds of our Con-
stitution under current precedent.45 I am aware, however, that there are
those who may say that the educational choice voucher plan is but one of
those "ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools,"4 6 or
one of the "new ways of achieving forbidden ends."'47 I wholeheartedly
disagree. The ends are not forbidden; the ways are not inappropriate. Nor,
for that matter, is a universally applied tuition voucher system one that
"approaches the verge ' 48 of a law respecting the establishment of religion.
Chief Justice Burger answered such concerns, commenting that "carefully
limited aid to children is not a step toward establishing a state religion-at
least while this Court sits." 49
44. Ia at 1205 (Tang, J., dissenting) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)).
45. I am indebted to Professor Michael W. McConnell for his thorough analysis of this issue.
He has stated that "recent decisions make it all but certain that a genuinely neutral and non-
discriminatory program of educational choice would be sustained." McConnell, supra note 10, at
144. "Education choice plans are in effect, a 'G.I. Bill' for kindergarten through high school, and
would likely sustain a challenge.... ." IdL at 147. The Supreme Court has "intimated" as much
in Mueller and Nyquist. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
46. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973).
47. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 266 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[S]ophisticated attempts to avoid the Constitution are just as invalid as simple-minded ones.").
48. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
49. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). In a subsequent decision Justice Powell wrote as follows:
It is important to keep these issues in perspective. At this point in the 20th Century we
are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Estab-
lishment Clause in the Bill of Rights. The risk of significant religious or denominational
control over our democratic processes--or even of deep political division along religious
1993]
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It is strange that in a federal republic where the jurisdiction of the na-
tional government and that of the several states often overlap, we seem un-
able to accept the same concerning religion and public policy. Church and
state are institutionally autonomous. Neither derives its existence, nature,
or authority from the other; neither is subservient to the other. Instead,
each is supreme in its own nature and within its own constitution. How-
ever, in a society such as ours, they are necessarily interdependent. As Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote:
In this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the
same community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that
the secular interests of government and the religious interests of var-
ious sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and
combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest often
has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a
sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every such statute were inva-
lid under the Establishment Clause.... The task for the Court is to
sort out those statutes and government practices whose purpose and
effect go against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment.50
States impose the requirement of compulsory education as a benefit to
all society; parochial schools benefit society as a whole, not just the children
enrolled in parochial schools. As Justice White explained:
It is our good fortune that the States of this country long ago recog-
nized that instruction of the young and old ranks high on the scale
of proper governmental functions and not only undertook secular
education as a public responsibility but also required compulsory at-
tendance at school by their young. Having recognized the value of
educated citizens and assumed the task of educating them, the States
now before us assert a right to provide for the secular education of
children whether they attend public schools or choose to enter pri-
vate institutions, even when those institutions are church-re-
lated. . . . Those who challenge this position would bar official
contributions to secular education where the family prefers the paro-
chial to both the public and nonsectarian private school."'
lines-is remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools,
any such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing oversight of this Court.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omit-
ted); see also Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding,
60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 645, 646 (1992).
50. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 117-18 (1992).
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661-62 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"It is enough for me," Justice White continued, "that the States and the
Federal Government are financing a separable secular function of overrid-
ing importance in order to sustain the legislation here challenged. That
religion and private interests other than education may substantially benefit
does not convert these laws into impermissible establishments of religion."52
In his concurring opinion in Lemon, Justice Douglas harkened toward
"a state of so-called equilibrium where religious instruction was eliminated
from public schools and the use of public funds to support religious schools
was deemed to be banned." 3 He inadvertently undermined this position,
however, by citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 4 the 1961 Supreme Court case
whose revolutionary footnote eleven identified "Ethical Culture" and "Sec-
ular Humanism" as "[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach
what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God."55 Jus-
tice Douglas mentioned both the "secular" aspects of a sectarian school's
education and the teaching of the "humanities," concluding that "sophisti-
cated attempts to avoid the Constitution are just as invalid as simple-
minded ones."'5 6
In fact, the sophisticated truth is that the deemed "equilibrium" is for
all public schools to promote the "religion" of "secular humanism," and
there lies the seeds of a problem with the Establishment Clause as well as
that of the free exercise of religion. As Professor Mary Ann Glendon
pointed out:
Nowhere have the deleterious effects of an excessively narrow
view of free exercise and an inflated concept of establishment been
52. Id at 664; accord Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The melancholy consequence of what the Court does today is to force the parent to
choose between the "free exercise" of a religious belief by opting for a sectarian education
for his child or to forgo the opportunity for his child to learn to cope with-or overcome-
serious congenital learning handicaps, through remedial assistance financed by his taxes.
Affluent parents, by employing private teaching specialists, will be able to cope with this
denial of equal protection, which is, for me, a gross violation of Fourteenth Amendment
rights, but all others will be forced to make a choice between their judgment as to their
children's spiritual needs and their temporal need for special remedial learning assistance.
One can only hope that, at some future date, the Court will come to a more enlightened
and tolerant view of the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus
eliminating the denial of equal protection to children in church-sponsored schools, and
take a more realistic view that carefully limited aid to children is not a step toward estab-
lishing a state religion-at least while this Court sits.
Id. at 387 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 395 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Id at 640 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)).
55. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.ll.
56. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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more apparent than in the cases involving education. In a judicial
pincer movement, one line of decisions requires the public schools to
be rigorously secular, while another has struck down most forms of
public assistance to parents of private school students who desire to
protect their children from a public educational system that is often
actively promoting values that are profoundly at odds with the fam-
ily's religious convictions. The net result has been that a crucial as-
pect of religious freedom can be exercised only by families wealthy
enough to afford private education after paying taxes to support
public schools.57
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."I' There are hundreds of articles
written about this opening passage to the Bill of Rights.59 Still, we are far
from any definitive agreement concerning its meaning; nor, it seems, from
the divergence of views and opinions, are we close to finding a consensus.60
The crux of the matter, however, is that the Framers of the First Amend-
ment intended it as a preservation of religious liberty6 1-a preventive mea-
sure against government intrusion into an individual's most personal and
most precious adherence to tenets that predate and precede all of our
founding documents and the many cases and articles that the founding doc-
uments have spawned. This first of our fundamental rights, both in its posi-
tion in the Bill of Rights-first enumerated in the First Amendment-and
in its precedence from the Author of Life, is rather as beacon. Perhaps a
better description, though, would be "twin beacons," which are "designed
to protect and preserve both government and religion.",62
As Professor Michael W. McConnell so astutely noted:
57. Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities and the Religious Freedom Language of the Con-
stitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 679 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. See, e.g., David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not 'Them'l): The
Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273, 292 n.64 (1991). For a
thorough annotated bibliography, see Lucy S. Payne, Uncovering the First Amendment: A Re-
search Guide to the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 825 (1990). The
bibliographical annotation includes selected materials published from 1980. Id. at 827.
60. See Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 839, 841 (1986). This is still the case despite Kurland's co-editing of a five-
volume treatise on the origins of the 1787 Constitution and the 1789 amendments. See THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
61. Kurland, supra note 60, at 860; Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment
Clause Analysis: A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245 (1991); see also
supra notes 3, 4, 7, 44 and accompanying text.
62. Arlin M. Adams & Sarah B. Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurispru-
dence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 318 (1988).
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Exponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the many
breaches in the wall of separation countenanced by those who
adopted the first amendment: the appointment of congressional
chaplains, the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for religious
education, the resolutions calling upon the President to proclaim
days of prayer and thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which
Congress paid the salaries of priests and clergy, and so on. These
actions.., are much easier to understand if one sees religious coer-
cion as the fundamental evil against which the clause is directed. ....
I have run across no persuasive evidence that the Framers of the first
amendment considered evenhanded support for all religions or reli-
gion in general, in the absence of a coercive impact[,] an establish-
ment of religion.63
Justice Story's 1815 opinion, much closer in time to ratification of the
First Amendment, is instructive: "[T]he free exercise of religion cannot be
justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of
every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for
the support of ministers [or] for the endowment of churches .... 4
Attorney William B. Ball has highlighted the impending public policy
conflict over education due to the so-called "equilibrium"65 that, in fact, is a
secular humanization of public schools, often inculcating students with
ideas and ideals that many in the general populace consider to be disvalues.
Referring to a state court case of some years ago,66 Mr. Ball reports the
position of a school board policy that conflicted with the values of the par-
ents in the community.67 The parents presented much evidence at trial and
were successful. The state supreme court also found in favor of the parents
63. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 933, 939 (1986). In Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'n, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd
sub. nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1983), and aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Chief
Judge Brevard Hand notes a resolution of July 27, 1787, which provided to the Moravian Breth-
ren at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, support in order "to civilize the Indians and to promote Christi-
anity." Id. at 1117 n.21 (citing ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982)). The same example is given in Smith, supra
note 61, at 255. Additionally,
tOin October 31, 1803, President Jefferson proposed to the United States Senate a treaty
with the Kaskaskia Indians which provided that federal money was to be used to support a
Catholic priest and to build a church for the ministry of the Kaskaskia Indians. The treaty
was ratified on December 23, 1803.
Jaffree, 554 F. Supp. at 1117.
64. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815).
65. See supra text accompanying note 53.
66. Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938
(1980).
67. William B. Ball, Parental Rights in Schooling, in A BLUEPRINT FOR EDUCATION RE-
FORM I1 (Connaught Marshner ed., 1984).
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based on the state constitution and certiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court.68
Educational choice initiatives are worthwhile for the many advantages
that they secure for our children, their parents, local communities, and soci-
ety in general. The choice of value-oriented education-whatever nature it
may take-is a prerogative of each of us and a blessing that our forbears
had secured long ago for us and our posterity.
It is essential that the courts remove the artificial conflict between "es-
tablishment" and "free exercise" and allow the people and their govern-
ments to institute programs of sweeping, honest, competitive educational
choice. Otherwise today's confusion may turn to chaos as parents flood the
courts to assert their rights of "free exercise" and parental privilege to as-
sure the proper education of their children.69
Let the "twin beacons" of religious liberty, free from unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusion, be used to guide both the ship of state and the barque of
church, not to hamper but to assist them in their differing but intertwined
spheres of human affairs.
68. Id. at 29-35.
69. Cf. The Education Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1992, at A16. "Recent lawsuits filed
by The Institute for Justice on behalf of parents in both Los Angeles and Chicago ask that control
of the children's share of state school aid be transferred to their parents so they can enroll them in
other public or private schools." Id.
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